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The stock maiket expects virtually all additional resources
provided to debtor countries to be used for debt service to
commercial  banks.  The stock market  capitalization  of banks
increased  about  $6 billion  at the time of the 1983  U.S. proposal
to increase  its quota to the IMF by $8.5 billion, and by a low
estimate  of $22.4 billion at the time details of the Brady Plan
were recorded.
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Two types of event have affected returns of  estimate of $22.4 billion at the time details of the
banks that are heavily exposed to third world  Brady Plan were recorded.
debt in the 1980s: actions by the debtor coun-
tries (such as declarations of moratorium) and  The estimate of the magnitude of these
official actions (such as changes in regulations  effects is infornative,  but the emphasis should
and in the provision of official monies to the  be on the direction of these effects, as they are
debtor countries).  robust to overestimation problems.
The effect of the first type of event has been  Clearly official resources provided to debtor
extensively investigated. There are fewer studies  countries do devolve to creditor banks.  But the
analyzing the effect of official actions on bank  debtor countries should at least gain insofar as
stock retums.  DemirgUc,-Kunt  and Huizinga  the reduction of a debt overhang eliminates
investigate to what extent official money tvail-  investment distortions.
able to debtor countries has devolved to the
banks, as reflected in stock market prices.  The results here stem from the fact that some
of the monies provided by the multilaterals are
They find that the stock market expects  specifically earmarked for debt service or are in
virtually all additional resources provided to  the form of general balance-of-payments support
debtor countries to be used for debt service to  that the developing countries can use for private
commercial banks. The stock market capitaliza-  debt service.  Official creditor resources that arc
tion of banks increased about $6 billion at the  specifically provided to finance developrnient
time of the 1983 U.S. proposal to increase its  projects are less likely to be allocated to bank
quota to the IMF by $8.5 billion, and by a low  debt service.
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AffairsComplex.  An  objective  oftheseries  is  to  getthese  findings  out  quickly,  even  if  presentations  are  less  than  fully  polished.
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Two types  of events  have affected  returns  of banks that  are  heavily
exposed  to third  world  debt  during  the  1980s:  actions  by the  debtor  countries,
such  as declaration  of moratoriums,  and  official  actions  such as changes  in
regulations  and in the  provision  of official  monies  to the  debtor  countries.
The effect  of first  type  of events  has been  extensively  investigated.  Among
these  studies  Schroder  and  Vankudre  (1986),  Cornell  and Shapiro  (1986),  Bruner
and  Simms  (1987),  and Smirlock  and  Kaufold  (1987)  study  the  effect  of Mexico's
1982  default;  Sachs  and  Huizinga  (1987)  and  Musumeci  and  Sinkey (1987)  study
the  effect  of Brazil's  1987  debt  moratorium,  and  Ozler (1990)  investigates  the
effect  of 1978-1983  international  loan  reschedulings  on bank stock  values.
There  are  fewer  studies  analyzing  the  effect  of official  actions  on
bank  stock  returns. Change  in regulations,  for  instance,  is analyzed  by
Eyssell,  Fraser  and  Rangan  (1989)  who investigate  the  effect  of amendments  in
regulations  governing  international  banking  operations. The effect  of
official  monies,  more specifically  the  effect  of indirect  provisions  made
available  as increases  in resources  of international  financial  institutions,
has  been studied by Cornell,  Landsman  and Shapiro  (1988)  and Billingsley  and
Lamy (1988). They show that  the  1983 increase  in the  U.S.  quota to the IMF  by
$8.5  billion  materially  affected  bank stock  returns. However,  official  monies
provided  directly  as loans  to  debtor  nations  are also important. For
instance,  earlier  in 1982  and in 1983  the IMF  provided  a series  of large
balance  of payments  loans  to  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  and  Mexico  that3
similarly  can  be expected  to have  affected  bank stock  returns. More recently,
as part  of the  Brady  Plan,  the  IMF  and  World  Bank  have made around  $24  billion
available  for  developing  country  debt  reduction. This paper investigates  to
what  extent  these  official  monies  made available  to debtor  countries  have
devolved  to the  banks,  as reflected  in  stock  market  prices.
For  several  episodes,  we calculate  the increase  in expected  repayment
by debtor  nations  reflected  in stock  market  pri_es. Stock  market  prices  are
found  to  have responded  strongly  to the  announcements  of large  IMF loans  to
Latin  American  debtors  in  late 1982  and  to a lesser  extent  in early  1983.  In
the  period  from  1984  to 1988,  we find  no clear  effects  on bank stock  prices  of
announcements  of large  commitments  by the IMF,  World  Bank  or national
governments. Apparently,  the  stock  market  went through  a learning  process
early  in  the  debt crisis  after  which  a pattern  of large  official  balance  of
payments  loans  from  the  multilateral  institutions  that  were partly  used for
private  debt service  was  clearly  established.
Of the  $8.5  billion  U.S. quota  increase  of the  IMF,  we estimate  that
about  $6  billion  indirectly  accrued  to  private  banks  worldwide. The recent
World  Bank quota  increase  of $74.8  billion  however,  did  not clearly  affect
bank stock  return  at its  passage  as the  increase  had  been fully  anticipated.
The IMF  quota  increase  of around  $60  billion  announced  in  May 1990  negatively
affected  bank stock  returns. This is due  to the fact  that the  market  expected
a greater  increase  whereas  the  United  States  was able to prevent  the  quota
subscriptions  from  increasing  by more than  50 percent.In the  case  of the  Brady  Plan,  the  paper  abstracts  from the  details
of the  menu  by which  debt  reduction  actually  takes  place that  can  be important
to the  banks  as  shown  by Demirguc-Kunt  and  Diwan (1990). While the  initial
reaction  to the  debt reduction  plan  wps  unclear,  during  the  period  of March 16
to  March  20  when the  extensive  IMF  and  World  Bank involvement  in debt
reduction  was secured,  bank returns  showed  a significantly  positive  reaction.
Interestingly,  heavily  exposed  banks  seem to  have  benefited  less  per  dollar  of
LDC  debt than  the  lowly  exposed  banks,  although  for  both types  of banks
repayment  prospects  should  have been  affected  equally. Heavily  exposed  banks
may  have  benefited  less,  as their  contingent  claim  on the  FDIC  was reduced
while  repayment  prospects  improved. Huizinga  and  Ozler (1990)  have shown  that
the  relationship  between  LDC  exposure  and  bank  valuation  is nonlinear  due to.,
federal  deposit  insurance. Important  news  concerning  the repayment  prospects
of LDC  debt  of course  affects  the  value  of the  banks'  contingent  claim  on the
Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC). Judging  from  the lowly  exposed
banks,  the  $24  billion  made available  for  debt  reduction  appears  to  have
increased  the  present  value  of debt  payment  by $22.4  billion. This result
confirms  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1988)  who  have shown  that the  Bolivian  debt  buyback
of (1988)  mainly  benefited  the  banks.  Comparing  the  experience  of the lowly
and  highly  exposed  banks,  we estimate  that  the  U.S. banks  contingent  claim  on
the  FDIC  has  been reduced  by approximately  $9 billion.
The remainder  of this  paper  is as follows. Section  2 describes  the
empirical  methodology  and the  data.  Section  3  discusses  the  events  and
presents  the  main results. Section  4 concludes.5
I1. Methodol,&X
The  main aim is co infer  from  stock  prices  the transfer  to the
commercial  banl:s  implicit  in the  provision  of official  monies  to the  debtor
nations. To start,  let  us consider  che  following  bank  valuation  equation:
(1) MVi  - LDCi  +  NLDCi  +  NBi  - LI 1
where  MVi  is  the  bank  value for  bank i, LDCi  is the  present  value  of the
expected  LDC debt  repayment,  NLDCi  is the  market  value  of the  bank's  non-LDC
assets,  LI 1 is  bank iiabilities,  and  NB 1 is the  value  of the  bank's  off
balance  sheet  items,  and in  particulir  its  contingent  claim  on the FDIC.  MV 1
is  measured  as the  stock  price  times  the  number  of shares  outstanding.
Now let  the  official  creditor  make availaile  resources  Li  to  country
j.  Lj  can  be a direct  loan to  country  j  or an indirect  transfer  of resources
to  a multilateral  agency  to  be channeled  to country  j  at a later  point.  For
bank i, this  affects  expected  repayment  LDCij  and  claim  NB 1. From (1)  we can
dlerive:
A Pi  E. dL. (2)  _+  I  J P.  1
P.  MV. E  .
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where  6  1  ij  and  e _  1  Pj  p is the stock  price,  and E
dL;  dL  E  j
denote expsu  ij
denotes  exposure  of bank i to countr-t'  j.6
The  coefficient  6  in (2)  measures  the  proportion  of the loans  that is
expected  to  be transfered  to the  canks.  All banks  are expected  to be repaid  in
proportion  to their  exposure,  i.e.,  __Cij__  E  i  The coefficient  e
S LDCJ  S  E..
1.  ij  ~I.  2.J
measures  the indirect  iripact  of official  transfers to debtor  nations  on
banks'  claims  on the  FIDIC.  For  a lowly  exposed  bank. ei  is close  to zero
while  for  highly  exposed  banks  ei  may  be substantially  negative. As for
each  bank  S  +  ei  will  be estimated  jointly,  values  of ei can  be inferred
by  comparing 6  +  ei  for  highly  and lowly  exposed  banks.
Our sample  of banks  consists  of roughly  21 exposed  and 9 non-exposed
U.S.  banks,  depending  on the  particular  event. A list  of banks is given in
Table  1.  As shown,  exposed  banks  are  grouped  as  highly  and  lowly  exposed
banks  based  on their  exposures.  Data  on daily  bank and  market  returns,  for the
period  January  1, 1983  to December  31,  1988,  are  obtain-'  from the tapes
constructed  by Center  for  Research  in  Security  Prices  (CRSP)  at the  University
of Chicago. The  market  return  is  dividend  inclusive  return  on the  S&P 500
index. Individual  bank exposure  data  on individual  countries  is obtained  from
The  Country  Exposure  Lending  Surveys.
Following  Smirlock  and  Kaufold  (1987)  and  Eyssell,  Fraser  and  Rangan
(1989),  the  following  set  of n linear  equations  is estimated  first.7
(3)  Rit-  1 +  iRMt  +  YdlDt +  elt'
R2t  a2  2RMt  +  'd2Dt  2t'
Rnt  a  nn  nmt +YdnD t  nt
where  Rit is the  return  on the  stock  of bank i  on day t.  Rmt is  the  market
return,  Dt  is  a duimmy  equal  to 1  during  the  event  period  of three  days
inc'.uding  the  day  before  and  after  the  event,  and zero  otherwise.)  The
system  is  estimated  for  the  complete  year,  with  daily  returns  for  each year in
which  events  took  place.
For the  set  of exposed  banks  only,  the following  alternative  system
is  estimated:
(3)  Rit  1i  1  Rmt  7  Yel  Dt  l  et'
R2t- a2  + 2Rmt +  Ye2  D  + e2 t'
Rnt-  an +  nRmt  + 7enDt  + ent
where  Ei  is  Eij  given  L:. Now  -6  +  e
mv i  f  Eij  ~~enn
The systems  are estimated  using  seemingly  unrelated  regressions  (SUR)
1 Using  the  same  dummy  variable  for  multiple  dates  is to  capture  leakages
and lags of information,  and is common in event  studies.  See for instance,
Eyssell,  Fraser,  and  Rangan  (1989),  and  Grammatikor  and  Saunders  (1990).8
technique,  which  allows  for  contemporaneously  correlated  disturbances. 2
Th4s technique  is  most appropriate  for  estimation  of a system  of equations
which  have nonzero  correlation  across  their  residual  terms  due to implicit
relationships.  In the  above  systems  implicit  relationships  exist  since  all
banks  are  members  of the  same industry.
The  hypotheses  to  be estimated  are:
H1:  The  event  parameters  are  zero for  a group  of banks.
H2:  The  event  parameters  are  equal  to  each other  for  a group  of banks.
The groups  of banks  we consider  are the  set  cf exposed  banks, the  set  of non-
exposed  banks,  and  all  banks  together. Hypotheses  are tested  separately  for
all three  groups  of banks.
For  system  (3),  we expect  the  event  parameters  7di  as a group to  be
different  from  zero  for  the  exposed  banks  and  for  all  banks  togA.ther  while the
parameters  should  be zero (and  equal  to  each other)  for the  non-exposed  banks.
If the  event  parameters  for  the  non-exposed  banks  are  different  from  zero,
this  indiLates  investors  can  not correc:-  .. j  distinguish  between  exposed  and
nonexposed  banks,  which is  a form  of contagion. Also,  if the  event  parameters
for  the  exposed  banks  are  equal  to  each  other,  this  points  at contagion  as it
indicates  stock  market  investors  can  not distinguish  between  heavily  and lowly
2  See Zellner (1962)  for a discussion  of the technique.  Using SUR in
estimation  of system  (3)  is  not  necessary  since  SUR  estimator  collapses  to  OLS
estimator  when  all the  independent  variables  are  the  same. However,  using  this
technique  leads  to  efficiency  gains  in estimation  of system  (4).9
exposed  banks
For  system  (4),  we expect  again  the  event  parameters  -y*  to be
significantly  different  from  zero for  the  group  of heavily  exposed  banks.  The
event  parameters  should  be equal  to each  other  if  ef-O  for  all  banks,  i.e.
the  FDIC  insurance  does  not  affect  bank valuation.  If the  hypothesis  of
equal  event  parameters  is rejected,  this  could  po'.nt  to (i)  contagion  or (ii)
a significant  relationship  between  the  ei's  and the  Ei's. A negative
correlation  between the  ei's and  Ei's  suggests  the importance  of the  FDIC
claim  in  bank  valuation.
III. Events  and Findings
a.  IMF  loans  in 1982  and 1983.  The  announcement  dates  of the  events
that  are  examined  are  reported  in  Table  2.  The first  five  dates  represent
news  concerning  large  IMF  loans  to Latin  debtor  countries  in late 1982  and
early  1983. The first  of these,  in October  1982,  was a $2 billion  loan  to
Argentina. The loan  came  at a time  that  Argentina  had $1.7  billion  in arrears
on $40  billion  of debt,  and  just 2  months  after  Mexico  declared  it  was unable
to service  its  debt in  August  1982. Upon hearing  the  news,  a banker  said,
"This  is  much the  best news  we have  had in  one  of the  bleakest  years I can
remember. 3
3  WSJ,  October  29, 1982.10
Stubsequently,  the  IMF  reacLed  agreements  on large  loans  to Brazil,
Mexico,  and  Chile in  December  1982  and  the first  two  months  of 1983,  The loan
to Brazil  was tentatively  agreed  in December  1982,  and formally  approved  in
February  1983. These large  loans,  unlike  some  smaller  loans  ,rom the
multiLateral  lending  agencies,  are  not  earmarked  to finance  specific  projects,
and  thus the  funds  are  generally  available  for  debt  service.  Regulations  tbat
required  banks  to disclose  their  LDC  exposures  in  the  10K  and lOQ reports
were not  announced  till  October  1982. Thus  during  this  period  bank stock
investors  had  very incomplete  information  about  individual  bank exposure,  and
we cannot  estimate  system  (4).  Estimation  of system  (3)  for the loan  to
Argentina  is reported  in  Table  3.  Fourteen  of the  eighteen  exposed  banks are
shown  to  have a  positive  return  during  the three  day  event  period. The
hypothesis  that  event  parameters  are  zero  is rejected  for the  exposed  banks,
and for  all  banks  together,  but only  at 10  percent  level  for  the  non-exposed
banks.
The  hypothesis  that  the  event  parameters  are equal  is rejected  for
all the  three  groups  of banks. The means  for the  event  parameters  (7 the
heavily  and lowly  exposed  banks  are  0.88  and  0.52  percents  respectively,
indicating  that  some information  about  individual  bank exposure  was  known to
investors.
Bank investor  response  to the  agreement  between  Brezil  and the IMF  in
December  1982  was much  less favorable. During  the  event  period,  16  of the  18
banks  experienced  negative  excess  returns. The  hypotheses  of zero event
parameters  is rejected  at the  5 percent  level  for  all  banks,  but only at the11
10  percent  level  for the  exposed  banks.  Apparently,  stock  market  investors
had anticipated  a s  ghtly  more favorable  loan.  Also,  for the  announcement  of
the  large  IMF loan  to  Mexico,  we find  that  the  hypothesis  of zero event
parameters  can  not  be rejected.
The  final  loan  of this  sequence  to Chile  was  approved  on January  10,
1983. According  to  a WSJ article  of January  4, 1983,  there  was considerable
doubt  whether  this  loan  would  be approved. The  results  of Table  3 show that
at the time  of announcement 3  exposed  banks  had  significantly  positive
excess  returns. Howeve:,  the  hypothesis  of zerc  event  parameters  is  not
rejected  for  all  banks,  and  only  at 10  percent  level  for  exposed  banks.  The
results  suggest  that  the  stock  market,  after  the initial  large  IMF  commitment
to  Argentina,  anticipated  that  large  commitments  to  other indebted  countries
would  follow,  which  explains  the  absence  of strong  stock  market  effects  at
announcements  of later  commitments. For  later  announcements  of large  IMF  and
World  Bank loans,  such  as the  IMF  commitment  of $1.8  billion  of loans  to
Argentina  in  January  1987,  and the  concommittant  commitment  by the  World  Bank
of $2 billion  to the  same  country,  we similarly  find  ins.gnificant  stock
market  effects. These  results  are  not  reported.
b.  Increase  in  U.S.  guota  to IMF  in 1983.  In 1983,  the  U.S. passed
legislation  to increase  the  U.S. quota  to the IMF  by $8.5  billion.  If as
suggested  above,  IMF  resources  to some  extent  are  used to enable  debtor
nations  to service  their  commercial  banks  costs,  then  an increase  in  U.S.
funding  to the  IMF  should  positively  affect  shareholder  wealth.  Cornell,
Landsman  and Shapiro  (1986)  found  that  at the  time  of the  passage  of the  bill12
to increase  the  U.S.  qucea in the  Senate  on June 8, 1983,  bank stocks  were
negatively  affected. Billingsley  and  Lamy (1988)  show,  however,  that  bank
stocks  were  positively  affected  when the  bill  was introduced  in the  Senate  on
March  7, 1983,  and that  cumulate  excess  returns  were  positively  related  to the
ratio  of  bank exposure  to  LDCs to  bank assets  plus loan-loss  reserves. This
formulation  does  not  allow  one to  measure  the increase  in shareholder  wealth.
The results  of estimating  systems  (3)  and (4)  are in  Table  4, showing
six  of eighteen  exposed  banks  experience  positive  excess  returns  at least  at
the  10  percent  significance  level. Estimates  of the  market  model  parameters
a;  and  pi  are the  same  as those  reported  in  Table  3.  The  non-adjusted  event
parameters  are  significantly  different  from  zero for  all  banks,  and the
hypothesis  that  they  are the  same  is rejected. However,  the  event  parameters
for  the  non-exposed  banks  for  themselves  are  also  different  from  zero,  and in
fact  3  non-exposed  banks  have significantly  positive  individual  returns. This
points  to  contagion,  where investors  can  not distinguish  between  exposed  and
non-exposed  banks. However,  this  does  not  point  to market  inefficiency  if
stock  holders  did  not  yet  have information  about  individual  bank exposures.
Bank  annual  reports  for  the  year  1982,  which  were  published  around  March and
April  of 1983  were the  first  to  contain  obligatory  information  on individual
bank  exposure. The exposure-adjusted  event  parameters  are  jointly  different
from  zero,  and the  hypothesis  that  they  are  equal  to  each other  can  not  be
rejected. This is strong  evidence  that  stock  investors  indeed  are aware  of
bank exposures.13
The means  of  the  exposure  adjusted  event  parameters  are  equal  to
0.142  and  0.398  for  the sets  of highly  and  lowly  exposed  banks.  This
difference  can  be attributed  to contagion  which  causes  investors  to  bid up
stock  of lowly  exposed  banks  too  much relative  to the  stock  of highly  exposed
banks,  or it  may reflect  the  role  of deposit  insurance. Heavily  exposed  banks
have  a relatively  large  claim  on the  deposit  insurance  agency. Thus  as the
repayment  prospects  of LDC  debt improve,  heavily  exposed  banks  stand  to see
their  claim  on the  FDIC  go down in  value  more than lowly  exposed  banks.
Hence,  one  expects  the  stock  of heavily  exposed  banks  to rise proportionally
less,  even if  markets  are fully  rational.
The estimated  values  of the exposure-adjusted  event  parameters  in
Table  4 can  be used to estimate  the  increase  in  shareholder  wealth  during  the
estimation  period. The estimated  mean  value  of the  exposure-adjusted  event
parameter  is  0.242. This  means that,  as there  is  a three  day  event  window  and
as the  quota  was to  be increased  by $8.5  billion,  that  stockholders  wealth  was
expected  to increase  by $6.2  billion. As U.S. banks  hold roughly  24 percent
of LDC debt,  at the time,  this  means  that  U.S.  bank stock  rose  by $1.5  billion
while  foreign  bank stockwealth  rose  by $4.7  billion. Thus,  the  U.S. quota
increase  to the  IMF  appears  to have  significantly  increased  the  value of non-
U.S.  banks.'
c.  The Brady  Plan.  In  March  1989,  details  of the  Brady  Plan  were
4  The  statements  about  the  non-US  banks  are  accurate  to  the  extent  they  are
affected  similarly  by these  events. Since  we use only  US bank data,  extending
these  results  to other  banks  worldwide  is at  best an approximation.14
announced. The IMF  and the  World  Bank  were to provide  developing  countries
with funds  for  debt reduction. Debt  Reduction  could  take  the form  of debt
buybacks  or the  exchange  of debt  for  exit  bonds  which  were partly  guaranteed
by the  multilateral  institutions.  As documented  by Madura,  Tucker  and  Zarruk
(1990),  and  Unal and  Demirguc-Kunt  (1990),  earlier  announcements  in December
1989  and  January  1990  already  suggested  that  official  policy  would  be
reformulated  towards  debt reduction,  but the  generous  support  from  the
multilaterals,  as announced  in  March  1990,  appears  to have  been largely
unexpected. Although  initially  (March  10) there  was no significant  market
reaction,  when support  from  multilaterals  was secured  (March  17),  bank stocks
reacted  positively. The results  of Table  5 indicate  that 11 exposed  banks
experienced  significantly  positive  excess  returns. Interestingly,  the
hypothesis  that  the  non-adjusted  event  parameters  are  equal  can  be rejected.
Indeed,  the  exposed  banks  appear  to have  very similar  parameter  estimates  of
around  0.02.  Consequently,  the  hypothesis  that  exposure  adjusted  event
parameters  are  equal is rejected. The lowly  exposed  banks  appear  to  have
benefited  disproportionately  to their  exposure. This relationship  is
confirmed  by a correlation  coefficient  between  the  estimated  parameter  and the
exposure  adjusted  event  parameter  of  -0.54  which  is significant  at the  3
percent  level.
Again,  the  different  experience  of the  highly  and lowly  exposed  banks
can  be attributed  to either  contagion  or to changes  in the  value of FDIC
claims  that  differ  systematically  with  exposure  across  banks.  If there is  no
contagion,  then  the  mean event  parameter  estimate  of 2.158  for  the  lowly
exposed  banks,  and the  $24  billion  amount  used for  Lj  gives  us the  estimate15
that  expected  bank  repayment  went up by $155  billion. As contagion  is  ruled
out  to arrive  at this  estimate,  it  must  be  an upper  limit. The  $155  billion
roughly  corresponds  to 20 cents  on the  dollar  of the  amount  of $622  billion  of
commercial  bank  debt to developing  countries  outstanding  at the  end  of 1989,
which  corresponds  to the initial  debt reduction  aim  of the  Brady  Plan. 5 The
mean event  parameter  of 0.38 for  the  highly  exposed  banks  yield  a lowest
estimate  of $27.4  billion  in increased  repayment  to  commercial  banks
worldwide. The  estimate  is a lower  limit  as it ignores  possible  changes  in
the  banks'  claim  on the  FDIC.
As  U.S. commercial  banks  held around  14.5  percent  of commercial  bank
debt to developing  countries as of the  first  quarter  of 1989,  the low  and
high estimates  of expected  additional  repayment  to  U.S.  banks range  from  $3.97
to $22.4  billion. 6 The  highly  exposed  banks  own  roughly  half of U.S. LDC
debt.  Thus the  estimate  of the  reduction  in expected  FDIC  payments  to  U.S.
banks  as a result  of the  Brady  Initiative  is  $9.2  billion. Again,  this is a
high estimate,  as it rules  out  contagion.
d.  Recent  World  Bank  and  IMF  Ouota Increases. In the last  three  years,
both the  World  Bank and  the IMF  had recent  announcements  of considerable  quota
subscription  increases. On February  19, 1988,  the  World  Bank  obtained  a $74.8
4  Ouarterly  Review,  June 1990,  Table  5. Of course  it is more than 20
percent of the debt of the Brady countries that were identified  for debt
reduction.
6  The  U.S.  commercial  bank lending  to  developing  countries  as a  percentage
of total  commercial  bank lending  is obtained  from  Tables 5 and 7A,  Ouarterly
Review,  September  1989.16
billion  general  capital  increase  to be subscribed  by member  countries  before
September  30,  1993.  On May 7, 1990,  the  IMF  similarly  obtained  an increase  in
its  resources  by 50  percent,  from  around  $120  billion  to roughly  $180  billion.
These  increases,  unlike  the  U.S.  increase  of its  IMF  quota  in 1983,  were the
result  of lengthy  reviews  within  the  multilaterals  and  of negotiations  between
principal  member  countries. Thus,  bank stock  response  at the time  of the
fiscal  agreements  is  only relative  to previous  market  expectations. Table  6
shows  the results  of estimating  (3)  and (4)  for  a 3-day  event  period
surrounding  the  announcement  of the  World  Bank  capital  increase. One  highly
exposed  bank  experienced  a significantly  positive  excess  return,  and  one lowly
exposed  bank experiences  a significantly  negative  excess  return. The
hypotheses  that  the  event  parameters  for  the  exposed  banks are  zero or equal
are  both  rejected. Moreover,  no clear  pattern  is  evident  in the  estimated
event  parameters. Evidently,  the  actual  acceptance  of the  World  Bank capital
increase  was  not  major  unexpected  news.
The IMF  quota  increase  of 50  percent  was  passed  officially  on Monday,
May 7, 1990. However,  the  day  before  the  G-7 already  released  a communique
endorsing  the  50  percent  increase. According  to  a later  WSJ article  this
accord  represented  a  victory  of the  U.S.  which  aimed  to limit  the increase  in
IMF  capital. 7 France  and the  IMF itself  had sought  a 100  percent  increase.
Thus the  passage  of the  accord  can  be expected  to be negative  news to the
banks.  This is  confirmed  by Table  7,  which  shows  that  excess  returns  on
Friday,  May 4  were negatively  correlated  to the  ratio  of total  bank exposure
7  Wednesday,  May 29,  1990.17
to  market  capitalization.  Apparently,  news of the  limited  increase  in IMF
resources  leaked  to the  market  on Friday. Using the  estimate  of -0.013  as an
approximate  figure  for  all  banks,  and taking  the latest  figure  on commercial
bank claims  on developing  countries  for  the  fourth  quarter  of 1989,  one  can
compute  that  bank industry  market  capitalization  was reduced  by around  $8.2
billion  worldwide  on account  of the  limited  increase  in IMF  resources.8
IV.  Conclusion
This paper  has investigated  the  impact  on the  wealth  of bank share
holders  of the  transfer  of official  resources  to the  debtor  countries. The
main  aim  has  been to derive  actual  estimates  of increases  in shareholder
wealth  following  important  news concerning  future  transfers  from the
multilaterals  to the  debtor  nations. The  main result,  consistant  with Bulow
and  Rogoff  (1988),  is that  the  stock  market  expects  virtually  all additional
resources  provided  to  debtor  countries  to  be used for  debt service  to
commercial  banks.  Bank stock  market  capitalization  increased  around  $6
billion  at the  time  of the  1983  U.S. proposal  to  increase  its  quota  to the  IMF
by $8.5  billion,  and  by a low  estimate  of $22.4  billion  at the  time  details  of
the  Brady  Plan  were recorded.
While  the  estimated  magnitude  of these  effects  are informative,  the
emphasis  should  be on the  direction  of these  effects  as they  are robust  to
overestimation  problems. Clearly,  official  resources  provided  to debtor
8  Ouarterly  Review,  June 1990,  Table  5.18
countries  do devolve  to,creditor  banks. However,  the  debtor  countries  should
at least  gain in so far  as the reduction  of a debt  overhang  eliminates
investment  distortions. Our results  sterA  from  the  fact that  some  of the
'monies  provided  by the  multilaterals  are  specifically  earmarked  for  debt
service  or are  in the  form  of general  balance-of-payments  support  that  the
developing  countries  can  use for  private  debt  service. Official  creditor
resources  that  are specifically  provided  to finance  development  projects  are
less  likely  to  be allocated  to bank  debt service.19
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Table  1.  List  of Exposed  and  Non-exposed  Banks.
Highly  Exoosed  Banks  EXP/MV  EXP/BV
(14)  Manufacturers  Hanover  418.8  212.7
(18)  Chase  Manhattan  239.7,  145.4
(17)  Chemical  Banking  215.6  142.0
(15)  BankAmerica  Corp.  180.9  173.1.
(16)  Continental  Bank  Corp.  154.7  136.0
(19)  Citicorp  101.7  101.5
(21)  Bankers  Trust  NY  100.3  81.4
(22)  First  Chicago  87.7  83.1
(24)  J.P.  Morgan  Co.  59.3  67.7
(20)  First  Pennsylvania  Corp.  56.2  i06.6
(23)  Bank of  New  York  56.2  55.7
Lowly  Exoosed  Banks  EXP/MV  EXP/BV
(26)  Southeast  Banking  Corp.  30.0  33.2
(25)  Republic  NY Corp.  28.8  33.3
(29)  Northern  Trust  Corp.  25.2  26.6
(27)  Bank of Boston  Corp.  18.2  15.9
(28)  Manufactures  National  15.3  17.9
(30)  Security  Pacific  12.8  14.7
(31)  Wells  Fargo  & Co.  12.1  17.7
(10)  NBD Bancorp  8.9  10.5
(12)  Midatlantic  Corp.  3.5  3.7
(13)  NCNB Corp.  0.2  0.3
Non-Exposed  Banks  EXP/MV  EXP/BV
(1)  Dominion  Bankshares  0.0  0.0
(2)  First  Alabama  Bankshares  Inc.  0.0  0.0
(3)  Crestar  Financial  Corp.  0.0  0.0
(4)  Baybanks  Inc.  0.0  0.0
(5)  U.S.  Trust  Corp.  0.0  0.0
(6)  State  Street  Boston  Corp.  0.0  0.0
(7)  Citizens  and  Southern  0.0  0.0
(8)  Barnett  Banks  inc.  0.0  0.0
'9)  First  Virginia  Banks,  Inc.  0.0  0.0
Notes:  EXP/MV  and  EXP/BV  are  LDC  exposure  as percentages  of market  and  book.
value  of bank's  capital  respectively.  LDC  exposure  is taken  as exposure  to
Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico,  and  Venezuela.  All  data are  as of December  30,
1988.  Numbers  in  parantheses  correspond  to  bank  numbers  in  Tables  3-6.22
Table  2. Dates  and  Events.
Date  Event
October  28, 1982  IMF  tentatively  arranges  $2 billion  in
assist.ance  for  Argentina.
December  15,  1982  IMF  reaches  tentative  agreement  to
provide  about  $4.9  billion  in loans  to
Brazil.
December  23,  1982  IMF  formally  approves  $3.96  billion
loan  to  Mexico.
January  10,  1983  IMF  approves  $882.5  million  in loans  to
Chile.
February  28,  1983  IMF  approves  $5.5  billion  in loans  to
Brazil
March  7, 1983  Proposed  to increase  U.S. quota to IMF
by $8.5  billion  introduced  in  U.S.
Senate.
June 8, 1983  Proposal  to increase  U.S. quota  to IMF
passes  in  Senate.
February  16,  1988  World  Bank Executive  Directors  agreed
on a $74.8  billion  general  capital
increase.
December  15-20,  1988  World  Bank  proposes  commercial  banks
with heavy  exposure  reduce  debt.
Mexico  seeks  debt restructuring.
March  10,  1990  Details  of the  Debt Reduction  Plan  were
announced.  Banks  would  be asked  to
forgive  some  of their  debt.  The
percentage  of debt to  be forgiven  was
uncertain  although  rumors  centered
around  30  percent.
March  17,  1990  Additional  details  of the  Debt
Reduction announced. The  Treasury
proposed reduction  of bank debt  by
convertion  into  bonds  whose principal
and interest  would  be guaranteed  by the
World  Bank and  the IMF.23
Table  2 (continued).
2UEvent
May  6,  1990  G-7  endorse  50%  increase  in  IMF  funds.
May  7,  1990  IMF  policy-making  committee  increase
institutions  resources  50%  from  about
$120  billion  to about  $180  billion.24
Table  3.  LArge  IMF  Commitments  to Latin  Debtors  in 1982  and 1983.
BANK  MARKET  MODEL  PARAMETERS  821028  821215  821223
Cl  pi  7di  -foi  'di
14  0.0002  0.91  0.0040  0.001
15  -0.°005  1.14  0.0080  -0.009
16  0.0003  0.81  0.0020  -0.005
17  0.0002  0.79  0.0060  -0.002
18  -0.0006  1.02  0.0040  0.001
19  0.0006  1.45  -0.0090  -0.006
20  0.0010  0.56  0.0850*  -0.002
21  0.0004  1.00  -0.0080  .0.024*
22  -0.0001  1.03  0.0060  0.0210
23  0.0005  0.55  -0.0004  -0.003
24  0.0007  0.89  0.0001  -0.008
25  -0.0001  0.56  0.0010  -0.009
26  0.0009  0.19  0.0010  -0.012
27  0.0005  0.48  0.0280*  -0.007
28  0.0010  0.87  0.0020  -0.026*
29  0.0010  0.22  -0.0010  -0.000
30  -0,0002  0.71  0.0020  .0.020*
31  0.0001  0.80  0.0040  -0.014
HYP1*  1.59*  1.47#  0.91
HYP2*  1.66*  1.25  0.93
1  -0.0003  0.27  0.0070  -0.0150*
2  -0.0001  0.19  0.0001  0.0006
3  0.0008  0.22  0.0010  0.0010
4  0.0006  0.24  0.0080  0.0040
5  0.0010  0.20  -0.0030  -0.0020
6  0.0020  0.34  -0.0030  0.0060
7  0.0010  0.08  -0.0050  0.0007
8  0.0003  0.45  0.0280*  -0.0150
9  0.0010  0.40  0.0110  0.0070
HYPln  1.72#  1.36  0.61
HYP2n*  1.93*  1.53  0.69
HYP14  1.68*  1.48*  1.01
HYP2a  1.73*  1.48*  1.0525
Table  3 (continued).
BANK  MARKET  MODEL  PARAMETERS  830110  830228
ai  A,i  -di  Yeid  'Ydi  'Yi
14  -0.0009  0.99  0.0180*  0.1100*
15  -0.0003  1.05  0.0180*  0.2700*
16  -0.0008  1.02  -0.0080  -0.1300
17  -0.0003  0.94  0.0006  0.0008
18  -0.0008  1.11  -0.0010  0.0080
19  -0.0004  1.50  0.0100  0.1600
20  0.0010  1.08  -0.0110  -0.0900
21  0.0004  1.17  0.0008  0.0100
22  0.0005  1.48  -0.0110  -0.1800
23  0.0010  0.48  -0.0040  -0.1000
24  -0.0005  0.82  0.0050  0.1200
25  -0.0003  0.49  -0.0010  -0.0200
27  0.0001  0.76  0.0200*  0.7200*
30  0.0010  0.74  -0.0060  -0.2000
31  0.0010  0.87  -0.0070  -0.1100
10  0.0010  0.42  -0.0100* -1.2100*
12  0.0020  0.14  0.0090  0.6500
13  0.0010  0.48  -0.0003  -0  0500
HYP1l  1.48#  1.58*  0.91  0.91
HYP2.  1.54#  1.60*  0.92  0.72
1  0.0010  0.41  -0.0030
2  0.0010  0.31  -0.0010
3  0.0010  0.10  -0.0080'
4  0.0010  0.04  -0.0030
5  0.0005  0.18  -0.0009
6  -0.0030  0.56  -0.0030
7  0.0020  0.23  0.0010
8  0.0010  0.34  0.0030
9  0.0010  0.56  0.0040
HYP1n.  0.41  0.58
HYP2ne  0.38  0.59
HYP1,  1.15  0.93
HYP2,  1.19  0.96
Notes:  *  and  #  indicate  significance  at 5 and 10  percent  levels  respectively.
Significance  levels  for  market  parameters  are  not reported. Hypothesis  1
tests  whether  all  coefficients  are  equal  to zero  and  hypothesis  2 tests
whether  they  are  all equal. Subscripts  e, no,  and  a refer  to tests for  the
groups  of exposed,non-exposed,  and  all  banks  respectively. F values  are
reported.26
Table  4.  U.S.  Quota  Increase  to  the  IMF in 1983.
BANK  830307
'Ydi  ±i
14  0.0040  0.040
15  -0.0140#  -0.2300
16  0.0220*  0.386*
17  0.0190*  0.187*
18  0.0190*  0.186*
19  0.0100  0.178
20  0.0110  0.130
21  0.0050  0.105
22  0.0170#  0.291#
23  0.0009  0,024
24  0.0100#  0.271#
25  0.0220*  0.621*
27  0.0100  0.431
30  0.0110  0.404
31  0.0130  0.229
10  0.0090  0.696
12  -0.0010  -0.143
13  0.0040  0.553
HYP1*  1.73*  1.73*














Notes  as  for  Table  3.27
Table  S.  Brady  Plan  Announcement  of March  1989.
BANK  MARKET  MODEL  PARAMETERS  890310  890317
ai  Oi  'Ydi  'Yei  ddi  e
14  -0.00040  1.16  0.0120  0.062  0.022*  0.122*
15  -0.00005  1.56  -0.0030  -0.073  0.022*  0.282*
16  -0.00080  0.92  -0.0003  -0.013  0.004  0.106
17  -0.00150  1.39  0.0003  -0,007  0.027*  0.268*
18  -0.00050  1.28  0.0130#  0.)31#  0.015*  0.144#
19  -0.00100  2.12  0.0100  0.283  0.034*  0.776*
20  -0.00050  0.51  -0.0040  -0.193  0.003  0.017
21  -0.00080  1.41  0.0100  0.243  0.023*  0.525*
22  -0.00030  1.17  0.0040  0.080  0.022*  0.585*
23  -0.00030  0.96  -0.0027  -0.270  0.004  -0.025
24  -0.00050  1.23  0.0040  0.279  0.028*  1.330*
25  0.00030  0.40  0.0050  0.114  0.0006  0.590
27  -0.00100  1.05  0.0030  0.378  0.0130  1.860*
30  -0.00070  1.19  0.0070  1.490  0.0170*  3.330*
31  -0.00009  0.85  0.0070  1.500  0.0130*  2.840*
10  0.00010  1.09  -0.0030  -1.090  0.0060  2.170
HYP1*  0.55  0.71  2.35*  2.96*
HYP2,  0.55  0.75  1.50#  3.15*
1  0.00020  0.65  0.0030  -0.010
2  0.00030  0.56  -0.0040  -0.006
3  0.00070  0.42  -0.0060  -0.012*
4  -0.00100  0.57  -0.0010  0.003
5  -0.00005  0.16  -0.0020  0.001
6  0.00090  0.70  -0.0003  -0.002
8  -0.00080  1.15  -0.0006  0.005
9  0.00070  0.46  -0.0040  -0.006
HYPlne  0.24  1.00
HYP2n,  0.21  1.10
HYPla  0.42  2.18*
HYP2.  0.44  1.94*29
Table  7.  The IMF  Quota  Subscription  Increase  of  May 1990.
Constant  EXP/MV
0.016  -0.013  R-0.22  N-24
(2.48)  (-2.51)  R-0.19
Note:  The  dependent  variable  is the  bank stock  return  on'May  4, 1990.  EXP/MV
is total  LDC  bank exposure  to  Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico,  and  Venezuela
divided  by bank  market  value.28
Table  6.  World  Bank  Capital  Increase  of February  1988.
BANK  MARKET  MODEL PARAMETERS  980219
0i  tzYdi  'Yi
14  0.0003  1.03  0.0210*  0.031*
15  0.0030  1.06  -0.0130  -0.021
16  -0.0060  0.72  0.0030  0.007
17  0.0010  1.19  -0.0040  -0.010
18  0.0050  1.10  0.0010  0.002
19  0.0006  1.48  -0.0070  -0.040
21  0.0001  1.00  -0.0006  -0.004
22  0.0010  1.10  -0.0030  -0.020
23  0.0010  0.58  0.0040  0.020
24  -0.0006  1.19  0.0090  0.140
25  -0.0002  0.32  0.0090  0.270
27  -0.0003  1.19  -0.0030  -0.130
30  0.0015  0.80  -0.0170* -0.770*
HYP1l  1.90*  1.90*
HYP2*  1.98*  1.83*
1  -0.00040  0.55  -0.0040
2  0.00040  0.42  -0.0140*
3  0.00030  0.40  -0.0060
4  0.00050  0.36  -0.0080
5  0.00003  0.16  0.0050
6  0.00060  0.76  -0.0080
8  0.00030  0.91  0.0007
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